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ConCeptual nonloCality
David Grandy
AbstrAct: nonlocality is a puzzling issue in modern physics. i propose that, aside from the 
experimental determination of nonlocality, the concept of atomistic light—discrete, self-bound-
ed photons—breaks down toward something like nonlocality when subjected to philosophical 
scrutiny. louis de Broglie made a similar argument regarding the material atom: the concept 
of the classical atom, when interrogated, collapses upon itself to offer a glimpse of wave-particle 
duality. light atoms or photons, i argue, similarly collapse toward the contradictory possibility 
of nonlocality. 
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up until about 1935 scientists assumed that events impress themselves upon the 
world in spatiotemporal ways. events, in other words, do not register or propagate in-
stantaneously; they occur in space and time. even so-called instantaneous events—a 
flash of lightning, say—is not instantaneous. it is just very swift, and swiftness makes 
sense only against a backdrop of space and time. 
in 1935 albert einstein, Boris podolsky, and nathan Rosen (epR) challenged the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics by arguing that it implied instanta-
neous action at a distance.1 in his reply to this challenge, niels Bohr stressed the holistic 
character of the experimental system, which, among other things, incorporates choices 
made by human agents designing the system.2 in making particular choices, scientists 
forgo other choices or possibilities. Measuring a particle’s position precisely, for instance, 
entails not simultaneously measuring its momentum, and one should not (a lá epR) 
use unmeasured (but inferred) data to conclude that quantum systems embody more 
information than can be had experimentally. our incomplete or probabilistic informa-
tion about a system, in other words, is fully descriptive of the system, which itself is 
probabilistic. 
By not explicitly countering epR’s point that the Copenhagen interpretation implies 
     1. a. einstein, B. podolsky, n. Rosen: “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of physical Reality be 
Considered Complete?” Physical Review 47 (15 May 1935), pp. 777-780. 
     2. niels Bohr, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” 
Physical Review 48 (15 october 1935), pp. 696-702.
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instantaneous action at a distance, Bohr left the possibility open. one might infer such 
action from Bohr’s emphasis on the overall unity of the experimental set-up where cer-
tain parts of a system remain mutually intact even while moving apart.3 this outlook, 
owing to later experimental tests designed to decide the issue, now appears correct. 
it seems that different parts of a system, though not collocated, may, in some circum-
stances, interconnect or “hang together” instantaneously. Here the word parts refers to 
photons, electrons, and other quantum entities. they may be locally situated but, in 
some circumstances, their effects, or the measurement effects impressed upon them, are 
nonlocal—that is, immediately felt or registered elsewhere. 
this, of course, is puzzling, but there are many puzzling aspects of modern physics. 
My intent is to show that the concept of atomistic light—self-contained, pellet-like pho-
tons—prompts the inference of nonlocality. put differently, the idea of atomistic light 
implodes toward nonlocality when subjected to philosophical scrutiny. one response to 
the puzzle of nonlocality, then, entails interrogation of the categories we use to frame the 
puzzle. First, however, a brief description of nonlocality.
nonloCality
Robert nadeau and Menas Kafatos define locality as the assumption that “signals or 
energy transfers between space-like regions cannot occur at speeds greater than light.”4 
Here “space-like” means that events are so situated as to preclude connection by a light 
signal: a photon generated at event a will still be moving toward event B when B occurs. 
Given this and our understanding that signals propagate no faster than light speed, one 
might justly conclude that two such events cannot instantaneously affect each other. 
the experimental determination to the contrary—that such effects do occur—is known 
as nonlocality. 
nadeau and Kafatos argue that nonlocality teaches us that the universe is more 
than the sum of its parts. We can sometimes, of course, profitably regard it as a mere 
aggregation of parts, those parts being its primary constituents, but this outlook is com-
plementary to the thesis that, in some sense, the cosmos is a seamless whole. neither 
stance exhausts the reality we know, and no part-hood ontology (one that privileges 
parts as ultimate ground) can adequately deal with nonlocality. at some level, then, the 
whole exists “within all the parts (quanta),”5 the universe being something like its own 
     3. as others have noted, Bohr’s language is obscure. Stating that the measurement of one particle will 
cause no instantaneous “mechanical disturbance” of another, distant particle, he nevertheless insists that 
“at this stage [the measurement of the first particle] there is essentially the question of an influence on the 
very conditions which define the possible types of  predictions regarding the future behavior of  the system.” (Bohr, “Can 
Quantum-Mechanical Description of physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, p. 700; emphasis in the 
original.) arthur Fine characterizes this wording as a retreat into positivism and a shift from “actual physi-
cal disturbance” to “semantic disturbance.” arthur Fine, The Shaky Game: Einstein Realism and the Quantum 
Theory, 2nd ed. (Chicago, il: university of Chicago press, 1996), pp. 34-35. 
     4. Robert nadeau and Menas Kafatos, The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters of  the Mind (ox-
ford, uK: oxford university press, 1999), p. 69.
     5. nadeau and Kafatos, The Non-Local Universe, p. 197.
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fundamental constituent. nonlocality, say nadeau and Kafatos, discloses this level, the 
mutual immanence of part and whole.  
this assessment, of course, goes beyond nonlocality proper—it is an interpretation 
thereof. and while it is surprising in its claims, those claims are no less surprising or 
counterintuitive than nonlocality itself. Hence it is difficult to assess nonlocality without 
reaching for unfamiliar imagery. after stating that experimental evidence of nonlocality 
teaches us that “two particles [otherwise thought to be spatially separated] are tangled 
together into a seamless unity,” George Greenstein and arthur Zajonc go on to remark 
that 
Hidden behind the discrete and independent objects of the sense world is an 
entangled world, in which the simple notions of identity and locality no longer 
apply. We may not notice the intimate relationships common to that level of 
existence, but, regardless of our blindness to them, they persist. events that appear 
to us as random may, in fact, be correlated with other events occurring elsewhere. 
Behind the indifference of the macroscopic world, “passion at a distance” knits 
everything together.6
the phrase “passion at a distance,” attributed to abner Shimony, is used here in direct 
response to “action at a distance,” which historically has denoted the propagation of 
signals and causal effects. Such are not propagated via nonlocality, and so it (passion at 
a distance) does not entail a violation of einstein’s postulate that information or causal 
influences can’t travel faster than light speed. What it does entail is a certain passive-
ness or even helplessness in the face of pre-existing unity or togetherness. no one can 
manipulate the individual parts of an epR system (an experimental setup that affirms 
nonlocality, say) to timelessly transfer information or causal effects. What happens at my 
end of the system happens before i can take charge of the situation to communicate a 
signal to your end of the system. in other words, i am not outside the system manipu-
lating its switches and levers. nonlocality thus prompts the suggestion that ultimately 
there is no outside—those who witness nonlocality have already been brought into its 
indissoluble unity. 
While nonlocality breaks the frame of everyday thought, i believe it is implicit in the 
concept of atomistic light. Decades ago louis de Broglie made a similar claim about the 
concept of atomistic matter. that idea, he insisted, opens out onto wave-particle duality. 
We turn now to de Broglie’s argument. 
atoMiStiC MatteR
another so-called quantum puzzle is wave-particle duality.7 Having long regarded 
     6.  Geroge Greenstein and arthur Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge: Modern Research on the Foundations of  Quan-
tum Mechanics, 2nd ed. (Boston, Ma: Jones and Bartlett publishers, 2006), p. 184.
     7. Richard Feynman introduces the double-slit experiment—an experiment which throws wave-particle 
duality into stark relief—by portraying its outcome as “a phenomenon which is impossible, absolutely im-
possible, to explain in any classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. in reality, it 
contains the only mystery. . . . the basic peculiarities of all quantum mechanics.” Richard Feynman, The 
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waves and particles as mutually exclusive phenomena, physicists in the early decades of 
the twentieth century struggled to blend them together. now we accept that interblend-
ing without feeling a need to fully understand or explain it. But according to de Broglie, 
one of the architects of wave-particle duality, the classical concept of the atom, when 
scrutinized, breaks down in such a way as to afford a glimpse of that duality.  Referring 
to the ancient debate over the nature of physical matter—whether it is finitely divisible 
(atomistic or discontinuous) or infinitely divisible (continuous)—de Broglie states: 
 Reality cannot be interpreted in terms of continuity alone: within continuity we 
must distinguish certain individual entities [atoms or quanta]. But these individual 
entities do not conform to the idea which pure discontinuity would give us of 
them: they have extension, they are continually reacting on each other and, a still 
more surprising fact, it appears to be impossible to localize them and define them 
dynamically with perfect exactness at each instant. this conception of individual 
entities, rather vaguely outlined against the background of continuity, is something 
entirely novel for physicists, and seems to be a slightly shocking suggestion to some 
of them. yet surely it harmonizes with the conception to which philosophical 
considerations might lead.8
the ancient atomists neatly separated discontinuity off from continuity by situating in-
divisible particles in a void whose very nothingness offered no resistance to the prospect 
of continuity or infinite divisibility. But in modern physics, this dichotomy cannot be 
sustained because particles sometimes behave as if they were continuous or wave-like. 
as de Broglie suggests, this blurring of categories, while surely the result of scientific dis-
covery, is nonetheless a consequence of imprecise thought, for the concept of a discon-
tinuous particle is pregnant with philosophical conundrums that erode the distinction 
between continuity and discontinuity.
in de Broglie’s mind, the primary conundrum is this: if atoms are indivisible and 
have spatial magnitude (as they were anciently conceived), it would seem that their 
inner structure must be homogenous or continuous throughout. But then continuity 
becomes descriptive of fundamental reality and we are faced with the task of explaining 
why the inwardly continuous atom can’t be subdivided. Why is there continuous matter 
for parts but no parts? What is more, should parts be found—should the atom be found 
to be not fundamental—what then? then, says de Broglie, we encounter a “vicious infi-
nite, since the new elementary particles of which the original particle, now seen to have 
been falsely so called, is supposed to be formed, will be faced with the same questions 
and the same difficulties.”9
let us try to pose the argument more rigorously. either physical matter is continu-
ous or discontinuous. By assuming that it is discontinuous we end up with atoms, indivis-
ible bits of matter. But atoms take up space, which implies that their atomistic surface 
Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 1 (Reading, Ma: addison-Wesley publishing Corporation, 1989), p. 37-2. 
emphasis in the original. 
     8. louis de Broglie, Matter and Light: The New Physics, trans. W.H. Johnston (new york: Dover, 1946), p. 
231.
     9. De Broglie, Matter and Light, p. 219.
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bounds either (1) continuous matter or (2) discontinuous matter. if it bounds (1), the atom 
cannot be said to be fully atomistic, for its inner structure is continuous. if it bounds (2), 
the atom is not atomistic at all, for its inner structure is discontinuous, and we are now 
faced with an infinite regress of discontinuities, which is exactly what continuity entails. 
in either case, the classical atom implodes upon itself toward continuity.
Had physicists, by probing the idea of the atom, discovered this conceptual break-
down, they would have been less surprised by the emergence of wave-particle duality—
this is de Broglie’s broader point. in what follows i probe the idea of atomistic light hop-
ing to show that this idea similarly breaks down toward a contradictory possibility.
atoMiStiC liGHt
people often explain wave-particle duality by saying that, depending on circum-
stance, light manifests itself either as a wave or as a particle. While this explanation 
may be a good first approximation, it is also misleading in that it preserves the idea of 
atomistic light; that is, indivisible, self-contained photons. thinking in this register, we 
imagine discrete bits or pellets of light moving through space.10
one problem with this picture is that it cannot, even in principle, be empirically wit-
nessed. even if our eyes were sensitive enough to detect a single photon, how would they 
see a photon in intermediate space? there are two interlocking considerations here, the 
first going back at least to plato and the second more recent.
the first consideration entails the stance that light is a principle of seeing, not some-
thing to be seen. it is for plato what we see by and is therefore not fully commensurate 
with visible reality.11 Saint augustine understood light similarly, and modern thinkers, 
less inclined to think about light’s religious or mystical possibilities, have straightfor-
wardly asserted that light is not an object of vision but the invisible means by which 
vision is accomplished.12 one gets a sense of this by noting that light shone into the night 
sky does not visually announce itself, just as a movie projector beam is not seen above 
one’s head in a theater. illuminated raindrops or dust particles may be seen, but that is 
light in conjunction with something material, not light per se. another example is the sun 
seen from the moon. it is a material ball of light against the blackness of outer space; it 
does not visibly radiate light because the moon has no atmosphere to scatter light.
     10. For caveats against this attitude see Rodney loudon, The Quantum Theory of  Light, 3rd ed. (oxford: ox-
ford university press, 2000), p. 1; Greenstein and Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge, pp. 36-37. 
     11. plato, The Republic, bk 6, trans. Benjamin Jowett (new york: Vintage, 1991), pp. 246-253.
     12. Jonathan powers writes: “When we see an object we see patches of colour, of light and shade. We do 
not see a luminescent stream flooding into our eyes. the ‘light’ we postulate to account for the way we see 
‘external objects’ is not given in experience; it is inferred from it.” (Philosophy and the New Physics (london: 
Methuen, 1982), p. 4) p.W. Bridgman’s comment is also apropos: “the most elementary examination of 
what light means in terms of direct experience shows that we never experience light itself, but our experi-
ence deals only with things lighted. this fundamental fact is never modified by the most complicated or re-
fined physical experiments that have ever been devised.” (The Logic of  Modern Physics (new york: Macmillan, 
1955), p. 151) other such statements from a broad range of thinkers could be offered, but i hope these will 
suffice to make the general point.
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the second consideration involves John Schumacher observation  that “nothing, 
not even light itself, can bring us news of its upcoming arrival; it brings us news of its ar-
rival only by arriving itself.”13 We do not, in other words, see light in intermediate space: 
light is its own messenger, and for this reason, Schumacher argues, it occupies “a unique 
place in our experience.”14 that uniqueness, he continues, entails (among other things) 
light’s ability to completely “drop out of experience” while effecting visual experience of 
distant objects.15 let us consider how this occurs. that is, let us, with plato and Schu-
macher in mind, review the standard account of photon-mediated vision.
upon impinging on the eye, light announces things like trees and buildings—things 
physically remote from the eye. at least this is what we typically imagine: image-bearing 
photons impacting locally, as it were, on the retina to effect immediate visual experience 
of distant events. What is interesting about this account is that the posited but not ex-
perienced local event—we do not see photons per se striking the eye—is simultaneous 
with a visual experience of something distant. in one stroke, photons exchange or give 
up their local presence—their contact with the retina—for the visual presence of distant 
objects. physically absent or at least distant, those objects are perceptually present, while 
photons, said to be physically present, are perceptually absent.
Summing up these two considerations we may say that (1) photons per se are im-
ageless or invisible and (2) photons are their own messengers, although they don’t an-
nounce themselves but other things. if both these claims are true, then it becomes hard 
to imagine how two counter-propagating photons could interact across space and time 
as we might expect them to in epR-type situations. that is, it is hard to imagine how 
such interaction, should it occur, could be anything but spaceless and timeless. Given 
(1), photons would have no images to facilitate the interaction across space and time ow-
ing to light’s innate invisibility or imagelessness (plato’s point); there would be nothing to 
signal with. Furthermore, given (2), the photons themselves would have to act as their 
own messengers (Schumacher’s point), which would seem to imply collocation rather 
than interaction bridging two separate locations. 
the salient point is that when we consider what they can and cannot be visually, 
photons lack the resources with which to interact across space and time; by their very 
nature they must interact at the same place—that is, instantaneously. Granted, this does 
not make much sense, but neither does nonlocality as it is spelled out by modern phys-
ics. But perhaps the concept of atomistic light (discrete, self-bounded photons) is at the 
bottom of this puzzle. When we probe that concept, it offers us a glimpse of nonlocality, 
just as the concept of the material atom, when probed, offers us a glimpse of wave-
particle duality. 
     13.John a. Schumacher, Human Posture: The Nature of  Inquiry (albany, ny: Suny press, 1989), pp. 113-
114.
     14. Schumacher, Human Posture, p. 114.
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